Was Anastasio Somoza García America’s son of a b*tch?
Somoza García, Sandino, and American influence on Nicaragua
In my previous post on Nicaragua, I gave some historical context for the downfall of the Somoza regime and the raise of the Sandinistas to power. One of my stated aims was to explore whether the Somozas were the product of United States policy in Latin America, remaining in power primarily thanks to American support:
He’s our son of a b*tch… but which one?
...I aim to examine the idea that anti-American sentiment in Latin America was, at least partially, a response to the aforementioned U.S. foreign policy, whether Somoza in particular was a product of this policy, remaining in power through the active support of America,
In that post I outlined some of the most prominent traits and events of the rule of each of the three Somoza family members: the patriarch, Anastasio Somoza García (Somoza García); the elder son, Luis Somoza Debayle (Luis S.D.); and younger son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle (ASol D). Here’s a very simple timeline showing the period of rule of each of these three Nicaraguan rulers:
Due to space constraints, I omitted some significant events in the previous post. One of the aims of this post is to address those omissions and provide a more comprehensive overview of the Somoza regime(s).
When Mena's rebellion broke out in Nicaragua, in 1912, Somoza García was just 16 years old. The conflict saw conservative General Luis Mena leading a coalition of conservatives and liberals against liberal President Juan José Estrada1 and his successor, the conservative Adolfo Díaz. These events ultimately led to a reaction by the United States2:
In mid-1912 Mena persuaded the Nicaraguan national assembly to [unconstitutionally] name him successor to Díaz when Díaz's term expired in 1913. When the United States refused to recognize the Nicaraguan assembly's decision, Mena rebelled against the Díaz government.
After Mena’s unconstitutional appointment by the Nicaraguan National Assembly Mena, his forces seized U.S. steamers, which were the property of U.S. nationals, and posed a threat to the American-owned railway from Corinto to Granada3. This provided the United States with a pretext to intervene militarily in the country4:
Navy and Marine forces operated in the field during the period August-November 1912. 42 officers and 1,030 sailors from seven ships; 43 officers and 1,272 Marines, most of whom were from battalion organizations.
That small force of 2,350 marines and sailors was enough to suppress the rebellion. In just two months the rebellion was over:
On October 23, Southerland announced that but for the Nicaraguan elections in early November, he would withdraw most of the U.S. landing forces. At that point, peaceful conditions prevailed and nearly all of the embarked U.S. Marines and bluejackets… withdrew, leaving a legation guard of 100 Marines in Managua.
Those 100 marines were the tangible manifestation of American occupation of Nicaragua, while U.S. control of Nicaragua's customs duties5 constituted the economic manifestation of this prolonged influence. They would stay in Nicaragua until January 1925.
And what were the long-term objectives of occupation?
First of all, the Conservatives retained their precarious hold on the Presidency, but their power rested on the presence of a strong Marine detachment at the Managua legation…
The most important accomplishment, of course, was the bringing of peace to Nicaragua. Respite from war offered the nation a chance to raise the standards of living of its people, and pay its debts - in short to fulfill the altruistic purposes of Dollar Diplomacy. American investments were protected by Marines during the revolt, and afterward by the Diaz government. Last, but far from least, the United States had intervened with enough vigor to prove once again that no European encroachment in Central America would be tolerated.6
Conservative governments would be the norm for the next 13 years, and together with the Marine presence in Managua, this led many Nicaraguans to believe that the United States favored conservatives.
After those 13 years of conservative rule (1911-1924), the Nicaraguan people yearned for a change in leadership. Following a revision of electoral law, overseen by American advisers7, the path was cleared for the Liberal party to reach power. Confident in American pledges of a fair and honest election, Liberals participated in the 1924 elections and successfully elected Vice President Juan Bautista Sacasa as co-head of a coalition government with President Carlos Solórzano8:
The Vice President [Bartolomé Martínez] was known to have ambitions to succeed himself in office; and the Liberals, relying on the American promise of fair elections, pointed out to the United States that this would be illegal. The State Department informed them that no government which seized power in defiance of the constitution would be recognized. Satisfied, the Liberals turned their energies to winning the next election.
Alas, the Solórzano-Sacasa government was not going to last:
Approximately three weeks after the last of the Marines had left Nicaragua, a group of Liberal cabinet members sat down to a banquet in Managua to the sound of popping champagne corks. A band of Conservatives burst into the room, accused them of treason, and had the lot of them thrown into jail. The final blow fell on 25 October 1925, when the followers of the ultra-Conservative Emiliano Chamorro seized the fortifications on La Loma. President Solorzano and Vice President Sacasa prudently left the country. Purged of its Liberal members, the Nicaraguan congress was reorganized; and on 16 January 1926, Chamorro took over as President.9
In the aftermath of his coup, conservative General Chamorro10 soon encountered a significant obstacle in exercising the power he had seized by force:
It is therefore with regret that I have to inform you that the United States has not recognized and will not recognize as the Government of Nicaragua the régime now headed by General Chamorro, as the latter was duly advised on several occasions by the American Minister after General Chamorro had taken charge of the citadel at Managua on October 25th last. This action is, I am happy to learn, in accord with than taken by all governments that signed with Nicaragua the treaty of 1923.11
When Liberal sympathizers, led by Sacasa, resolved to challenge Chamorro’s regime by force, igniting the Constitutionalist War, the U.S. made efforts to mediate between the opposing factions. The American goal was to secure a mutual agreement on an interim president who could steer the nation back towards constitutional rule.
It was at this time when a young Anastasio Somoza García, the husband of Sacasa’s niece, became involved with the Liberal faction in the Constitutionalist War.
Somoza García
Under pressure from the United States, Chamorro resigned in November 1926. Following this, the Nicaraguan congress appointed former President Adolfo Díaz as the new President, who was promptly recognized as the legitimate ruler of Nicaragua by the U.S. Meanwhile, Sacasa, who had returned to Nicaragua with the aim of assuming the presidency, did not recognize Díaz's legitimacy.
The deployment of American forces to Nicaragua to support Díaz against the rebellion once again positioned the United States as siding with the Nicaraguan Conservatives in the eyes of the Nicaraguan Liberals.
Therefore it’s not surprising that Somoza García was part of the Liberal forces, led by General José María Moncada, fighting against the Americans. In fact, he was on the same side of the war as Augusto Sandino, who commanded a small force in the north of Nicaragua.
This is the same Augusto Sandino that would go on to inspire the Sandinista guerrilla decades later.
Eventually, the U.S. government successfully brokered a deal between the warring factions, leading to the signing of the Pact of Espino Negro to end the conflict. Under the terms of the accord, Díaz would remain as president until 1928, when new elections, overseen by the U.S., would be held. Additionally, American officers would train a new non-political, militarized police force called the National Guard.
The creation of the National Guard, initially trained and led by English-speaking American officers, proved to be a godsend for Somoza García. As one of the few Nicaraguan leaders with some military experience, strong connections within the Nicaraguan elite, and proficiency in English12, Somoza García capitalized on this opportunity to join and rapidly ascend the ranks of the Guard.
Sandino, on the other hand, responded to Nicaragua's return to constitutional normalcy13 by rejecting the Pact of Espino Negro and demanding the complete withdrawal of all American forces from the country.
After the last American marines were pulled out of Nicaragua in 1933, Sandino came up with new demands, or something:
Sandino was reported to have said that he would not turn over his arms to the Guardia Nacional because of the unconstitutionality of that organization… At the same time, if I may judge from the conversations I have had with [Doctor Salvador Calderón Ramirez], he is somewhat disillusioned, and has referred in disparaging tones to Sandino’s intellectual capacity for expressing his ideas. A similar opinion was expressed the other day by Doctor Léonardo Argüello, Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he stated that he carefully listened to Sandino talk for half an hour, but was unable afterwards to express any opinion concerning what had been said because he did not know what had been said. High officials in the Government have manifested an impatience because so much time has been and is being spent in long negotiations with such a person.14
I won't delve into the details of how Somoza García likely orchestrated the assassination of Sandino or how he later executed a coup in 1936 to depose President Juan Bautista Sacasa (who had succeeded President Moncada, elected in 1928). But I will remark that there was a widespread belief that the United States had a hand in Sandino's assassination during the years that followed.
In the words of Arthur Bliss Lane, the American ambassador to Nicaragua15:
I had not meant to indicate to the Department that the rumor is current that we favor Somoza for the Presidency. Such a rumor has not reached me and I do not find any record of having so informed the Department. The feeling exists, however, that we favor the Guardia as contrasted with the Government, such feeling being chiefly of the following:
(a) Our creation of the Guardia.
(b) My having seen a great deal of Somoza (it is not recalled that I have seen the President many more times nor is it generally known that I have acquainted him with every meeting I have had with Somoza).
(c) Silence as to our policy.
(d) Feeling in the United States against Sandino. (e) Moncada’s having lunched with me on February 21.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me this morning that it is not merely a matter of convincing Somoza but of convincing the whole Guardia which, according to him, is responsible for the circulation of the rumor that I am the intellectual author of the killing of Sandino. He said that the Guardia is convinced that I—and hence the United States Government—favors the Guardia as against the Government.
Mr. Dawson who had the opportunity to speak to persons who should be well informed in Colombia, Panama and Costa Rica, reports that the feeling seemed to be current in those countries not only that I conspired to bring about the assassination of Sandino but also that we are now supporting the Guardia Nacional, as contrasted with the Government.
The American-trained Guardia naturally assumed that their new boss was favored by the Americans. Yet this did not mean the United States had completely failed in its goal of creating a non-political military force for Nicaragua16:
But not all of the National Guard was in favor of Somoza, there were sectors of the officers who were loyal to President Sacasa, in the barracks of Corinto, Rivas and Managua. So, with the coup d'état, Somoza García wanted not only to overthrow the government but also to exercise total control over the National Guard.17
Once Somoza García was in power though, the National Guard would become inextricably intertwined with the regime.
As I mentioned in my previous Nicaragua post, the Truman administration withheld recognition of the Nicaraguan government, led by two successive figurehead Presidents handpicked by Somoza García, for an entire year in the aftermath of the dictator’s May 1947 coup. This again contradicts the notion that Somoza García was chosen or imposed by the U.S. as their man in Nicaragua.
And the eventual recognition of Somoza García’s man, Víctor Manuel Román y Reyes, was largely due to pressure from other American countries, such as the Dominican Republic18 and Costa Rica19:
The [Costa Rican] Picado administration was determined to cooperate with the other American republics in a common policy. He said, however, that the present non-recognition policy represents great sacrifice and very real danger for Costa Rica. He remarked that there is already disorder in Nicaragua and that internal cleavages are widening, and he predicted that the eventual result is likely to be civil war.
[Costa Rican] Ambassador Gutiérrez called attention to the common border of the two countries and asserted that civil strife in Nicaragua would inevitably have serious consequences in Costa Rica. He declared that in any armed struggle within Nicaragua the losers would attempt to flee to Costa Rica and that the forces of the stronger side would attempt to cross the border in pursuit.
[Costa Rican] Ambassador Gutiérrez remarked that in his opinion the non-recognition policy affects Costa Rica most seriously of any American republic and, after Costa Rica, the United States. He said that he realizes that instability in Nicaragua represents a constant preoccupation for the United States. In that connection, he made reference to previous instances of armed intervention by the United States in Nicaragua and said that he was confident that the United States would not wish to send troops into Nicaragua again. Mr. Armour in his reply to this statement made it clear that such a course would be completely out of the question and that it had not the slightest possibility of being entertained by this Government.
Additionally, it's noteworthy that Teodoro Picado, the Costa Rican President in the previous quote, was elected as the head of a political coalition that included the local communist party (PVP)20. This makes me doubt the notion that Somoza García’s recognition might have been contingent on his “anti-communism”.
Years later, in the aftermath of the 1956 assassination of Somoza García, the American diplomatic service continued to abide by a policy of withholding support from the dictator’s successor, his son Luis Somoza Debayle21:
Most groups in Nicaragua are believed friendly toward the United States…. Essential opposition friendliness has been somewhat tempered by the belief of many that the United States was “supporting” the Somoza regime. The demonstrations with regard to the medical aid to Somoza may have increased the bitterness of those who were already bitter, and might be used to convince some of those who were more or less on the line that the United States is against them…If the U.S. gives the appearance of supporting Luis Somoza, it will be taken as a sign that we are continuing to deny opposition aspirations…It would be a convenient basis for communist propaganda.
On the other hand, if we do not give the appearance of wholehearted support to Luis we might lose in some circles.
…there are, I believe, three general policies which can be followed:
1. Careful non-intervention with a sufficient, carefully-conceived build-up to get this across prior to elections.
2. Calculated support for Luis Somoza on the basis that Luis will get himself elected anyway and the Guardia will stave off trouble indefinitely.
3. Disguised intervention to the extent that we use our influence to try to mold Luis and Tachito; to persuade them to hold real elections with the hope of an orderly transition from the Somoza regime before something causes it to collapse anyway.
For these reasons it is believed that a careful policy of non-intervention would be preferable in the long run.
In a memorandum to Wollam, October 16, Rubottom22 wrote: “I believe that we should adopt the first of the alternatives you discuss, namely ‘careful non-intervention.’…”
Reading through the sources on Somoza García, he most definitely looks like an opportunist and a deceiver. But I see no evidence of Somoza García being America’s man, or America’s son of a b*tch if you will.
I’ve done a lot of reading for these last two posts on Nicaragua, and I want to thank everyone who has taken the time to read them. Reading so many sources takes a lot of time though, and I’m thinking of trying a different approach, by writing shorter, more frequent posts.
Also, you may have noticed that I’ve added a link to my Twitter/X account (@javiero08640650). I should probably make a better effort to promote this Substack, and being more active on Twtitter/X might be a good way to achieve that.
Estrada had some assistance from the U.S. when he rebelled in turn against president José Madriz.
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_occupation_of_Nicaragua#Mena's_rebellion_(1912)
Unfortunately, I was unable to locate a definitive source confirming the exact ownership of the railroad, but it appears that a significant share of the company was in American hands. Suffice to say that even if the railroad was not U.S.-owned, it played a crucial role in maintaining the link from the Atlantic Coast, where steamboats transported passengers and goods up the San Juan river and across Lake Nicaragua, to the Pacific coast port of Corinto. This transport link was considered strategic by the United States, particularly at a time when the Panama Canal was not yet operational (it eventually opened in 1914).
“Sailors as Infantry in the U.S. Navy“, https://web.archive.org/web/20121106122856/http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/naval_infantry.htm
See: https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/knox-castrillo-treaty-1911
“The United States Marines in Nicaragua“, Bernard C. Nalty 1958, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/The%20US%20Marines%20in%20Nicaragua%20by%20Bernard%20C.%20Nalty.pdf?ver=2018-10-30-075558-780
The revision of electoral law was supervised by Harold W. Dodds, before being submitted to Nicaraguan congress.
“The United States Marines in Nicaragua“, Bernard C. Nalty 1958, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/The%20US%20Marines%20in%20Nicaragua%20by%20Bernard%20C.%20Nalty.pdf?ver=2018-10-30-075558-780
“The United States Marines in Nicaragua“, Bernard C. Nalty 1958, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/The%20US%20Marines%20in%20Nicaragua%20by%20Bernard%20C.%20Nalty.pdf?ver=2018-10-30-075558-780
Not to be confused with his more famous distant relative Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the assassinated journalist I mentioned in my previous post.
“The Non-Recognition of the Chamobro [sic] Government in Nicaragua“, L. H. Woolsey 2017, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/nonrecognition-of-the-chamobro-government-in-nicaragua/076C9422B95B7C00F6B462A49D10E941. The treaty mentioned is the 1923 Central American Treaty of Peace and Amity, sponsored by the United States. This treaty, designed to foster stability in the region, established that all Central American nations would denounce and not recognize any government which arose in any of the five signatory nations through illegal means.
As a teenager, Somoza García was sent to live with relatives in Philadelphia, where he attended the Peirce School of Business Administration.
General Moncada won the 1928 election, and the subsequent 1932 election led to a liberal Sacasa government.
See “The Minister in Nicaragua (Lane) to the Secretary of State“, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v05/d516
See “The Minister in Nicaragua (Lane) to the Secretary of State”, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v05/d532, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v05/d547
See “NICARAGUA.- 27 de Mayo de 1936: golpe de Estado de Anastasio Somoza García“, https://elsoca.org/index.php/america-central/movimiento-obrero-y-socialismo-en-centroamerica/3356-nicaragua-27-de-mayo-de-1936-golpe-de-estado-de-anastasio-somoza-garcia
I consider this to be subject to interpretation, since some sources mentioned that a barracks commander (Acosasco barracks in León) and the position of Chief of Staff of the National Guard were bestowed upon close relatives of President Sacasa (a brother and a cousin). This action could suggest Sacasa's skepticism regarding the Guardia's purported non-political nature, and an attempt to ensure the loyalty of the enlisted men to his government, as opposed to Somoza García, by appointing officers from his inner circle. It also points to Sacasa acknowledging that without an American presence in Nicaragua, politics might revert to the dynamics of seizing and maintaining power by force, a recurrent theme throughout much of Nicaragua’s previous history.
Regarding the Dominican Republic, one could reasonably assume a significant dose of cynicism, given that the nation was under the rule of the dictator Rafael Trujillo.
See “Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Area Specialist, Division of Central America and Panama Affairs”, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v08/d536.
The left-wing Picado, passed away in 1960, in Nicaragua where he had lived in exile for several years.
See “Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Nicaraguan Affairs (Wollam) to the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Neal)“, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d108
Rubottom was Roy R. Rubottom Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1957 to 1960.