Informative and interesting article--and in my opinion *not* too long...
'In fact, the depletion of al-Andalus’ elite was so severe that Habbus al-Muzaffar, King of the Taifa of Granada - one of the several Muslim kingdoms established after the fall of the Caliphate of Cordoba - had to appoint a Jew - Samuel ibn Naghrillah, himself a refugee from Cordoba - as his Vizier, breaking with the long-standing Muslim tradition against appointing Jewish subjects to positions of power'
This is one interpretation. Couldn't it also have been that the Jews had rendered exceptional assistance to the king, as they had previously rendered an exceptional disservice to the Visigoths in opening the gates of Toledo to the Muslims a few hundred years before?
I have doubts about the degree to which HHC was wielded by the Iberian Muslims themselves. Dario Fernandez-Morera's book Myth of the Andalusian Paradise argues that Muslim achievements in science, engineering, literature etc are overstated and that they depended heavily on native Spanish (and Jewish) brains in the service of Muslim lords. By your reckoning this too would be a form of 'cheating'.
I don't fully understand what explanation you are proposing for Zaragoza's superior position relative to the other post-Taifa Muslim states. I take you to mean it was because of 'cheating'--proximity to the HHC Christian Aragonese--rather than the HHC the Muslim Zaragozans themseves possessed. Or have I misunderstood?
NB: By no means do I pretend to any great learning on this subject; but I am interested in it.
Yes, of course. Though I still find it intriguing that al-Muzaffar would appoint Samuel to such a high post (the highest), instead of assigning him to a useful but less powerful position, and that it would happen so soon after the Fitna.
I agree with Fernandez-Morera in the sense that Berber and Arab Muslim lords depended heavily on native Spanish, yet Muslim, brains. Assuming that's what Fernandez-Morera (I haven't read him, will do) says, I'm not sure I would qualify that as 'cheating', as they were not importing HHC (or troops) from outside their realm. Already by the 10th century (as Luis Aldamiz notices in another comment) Muslim leaders were to a large degree the descendants of natives, and many notable Andalusian families of "Arab" stock had likely faked their Arab pedigree simply because it was more prestigious than a native background at the time.
I intend to write a follow-up post on the Taifa of Zaragoza (currently reading some material), but to summarize, I believe it is the HHC the Muslim Zaragozans themselves possessed. I think the distribution of human capital, and it's relative abundance or scarcity, in 11th century Spain was not much different from what it is now. And the territories of both Christian Aragon (current province of Huesca) and the Taifa of Zaragoza (current provinces of Huesca, Zaragoza, Teruel, and even large parts of Lleida and Tarragona) correspond to provinces with pretty high GDP per capita (and HDI) among Spanish provinces, as of today.
Maybe the Jews supplied finance or other help during the fitna on such a scale as to render quite proportionate Samuel's extraordinary elevation. Eh I'm just speculating; you might well be right.
Yes I've read that there were many converts to Islam among the Spaniards. I didn't realise it was as common as you say, but if it was Fernandez-Morero is even more right than I thought he was. It always seemed strange to me that the very near descendants of a bunch of desert tribesmen, allied with primitive tribesmen of the Atlas, could produce such achievements (even if they have been exaggerated) so soon after they had irrupted from the Arabian interior. Absorption of the much more cultured Visigothic-Spanish natives is the best explanation. Do you know whether the Zaragozan king was himself a Christian convert?
F-M's main thesis, of course, is that none of the achievements of Andalusia were accomplished in the midst of a Vibrant and Diverse and Mostly Peaceful multicultural society: the Christians *had to* convert, at least in appearance in order to lend their higher culture to the Muslim states. Incidentally, I wonder if anybody has looked into the degree to which the first fitna might have been in part a pseudo-ethnic conflict between recent converts and the core Arab-Berber stock...
By the way: I have seen the famed mosque at Cordoba. While it is impressive in scale and has a very distinctive and magical atmosphere, as a feat of engineering it is not that great; similarly the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, which to me is mainly remarkable for having been built inside a Roman temple. Really the impact and distinction of both buildings derives from the fact that they're examples of harmonious architectural accretion, which was in both cases was the product not of harmonious multiculturalism but of outright violent conquest and the subordination of one faith to another.
Point taken about 'cheating'; my apologies if I came across as unnecessarily critical on a minor point.
Even considering the Visigothic-Spanish as the descendants of classical Rome, I'm not 100% convinced they were more cultured than the Arabs (maybe than the Berbers?) at the time of the conquest, in the 8th century.
The Arabs established what looks like a much more sophisticated state than the one operated by the Visigoths. But then again, you could accuse the Arabs of largely copying the Byzantine model.
Maybe the merit of the Arab caliphate was to utilize the full (high) potential of native Spaniards in a way that the Visigoths had not managed to achieve?
About the Zaragozan rulers, the late (11th century) Zaragozan dynasties (Tujibids, Banu Hud) claimed Arab descent (though there's a difference between claiming and actually being). But some of the early rulers of Zaragoza and nearby areas were of native stock:
And most famously, the Banu Qasi, who ruled Zaragoza almost autonomously for more than a century: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banu_Qasi (and who also married Christian noble wives).
PS: I don't mind criticism. One of my main motivations for writing this Substack is to get feedback, comments and pushback on what I write.
I'm conscious that there's a fine line between being a vexatious quibbler and an informed commentator of real value, and I'm not certain that my remarks fit into the latter category. so I will make this one my last on this thread.
'Even considering the Visigothic-Spanish as the descendants of classical Rome, I'm not 100% convinced they were more cultured than the Arabs (maybe than the Berbers?) at the time of the conquest, in the 8th century.'
F-M seems to think that they were and that they were on the ascent culturally before the invasion. Disunity was their enemy, but this has been a feature of Spanish polities since at least the Iron Age, not excluding the Muslims or the Spain of the present, and is not fairly regarded as a bug uniquely afflicting Visigothic society. At any rate the state of Visigothic culture at the Muslim invasion is traduced unfairly by the 'Ammmmmmaaaazing Multicultural Islamic Spain' school of thought.
'The Arabs established what looks like a much more sophisticated state than the one operated by the Visigoths. But then again, you could accuse the Arabs of largely copying the Byzantine model.'
Yes one could--with the *indispensible* assistance of the Spanish (ex-)Christians.
'Maybe the merit of the Arab caliphate was to utilize the full (high) potential of native Spaniards in a way that the Visigoths had not managed to achieve?'
Maybe yeah--but at what cost to the sovereignty, dignity and cultural integrity of the natives? Also this seems to me an unattractively sterile and instrumentalist way of looking at humanity and history; I have the same misgivings about 'EHC' centred schemata in general (cf. recent dispute over H1B visas in America).
It's fascinating that so many noble Muslim families (and even potentates) were Visigothic-Spanish in origin. I wonder what effects this fact might have had on the stability of the state. Was there really a true modus vivendi between the Spanish converts and the Arab and Berber Muslims? Were the Visigoth converts really as *down with the program' as one is supposed to believe? Could such cultural lift-off as there was in Muslim Spain have been achieved without widespread (only half sincere?) conversion by the Spaniards? Is there a case for regarding the Almoravid invasion as in part an ethnoreligious re-conquest? Am I WAY OFF in even suggesting these possibilities?
"F-M seems to think that they were and that they were on the ascent culturally before the invasion"
That's interesting. I haven't reached the part of F-M when he talks about that (I'm barely around page 30). But regarding conversion I'll quote F-M:
"According to this line of thinking, if the Christians did not see the invaders as Muslims, they could not have seen the invasion as a religious confrontation. Thus the Muslim “expansion” would have been motivated by material rather than religious reasons... There are several problems with this argument. First, it overlooks the fact that Muslim chronicles of the Muslim conquests portray jihad as Holy War...The historian Ibn al-Qutiyya (d. 977), who was of Visigoth ancestry, narrates how one of the Muslim commanders was inspired by his dreaming of Muhammad and His Companions, with their drawn swords, entering Spain."
Did al-Qutiyya think of himself as a convert? Some (most?) of his ancestors must have thought of themselves as converts, and were probably seen by others - Muslim and Christian alike - as converts. Yet once enough generations have passed, the descendants of converts will no longer think of themselves as converts, and given enough conversions and enough intermarriage (many "Arab" Andalusis likely had a few real Arab ancestors - 3 out of 32?, 4 out of 64? - but were mostly native Spaniards) to develop into a substantial minority (or even majority) the descendants of converts will probably think of themselves as natives, regardless of their affiliation with the newer religion.
The cost to the sovereignty, dignity and cultural integrity of the natives might well be real and substantial, but it's only paid once (or twice for those who converted back again in the 13th-14th century?). An 11th or 12th century Muslim Spaniard had not only forgotten whatever pain and trauma the Muslim conquest and subsequent (insincere at first, sure) conversion had inflicted on his/her ancestors, but was probably actively trying to pass for a descendant of Arabs. Remember, Berbers kept their Berber language, Persians kept their Persian language, but Muslim Spaniards wholeheartedly adopted Arabic.
If there was a problem between different Muslim communities, it was likely between Berbers (maybe Saqalibs/slaves) and Andalusis (everyone else).
"Could such cultural lift-off as there was in Muslim Spain have been achieved without widespread (only half sincere?) conversion by the Spaniards?"
I believe the answer (purely speculative on my part, of course) is no. With no widespread conversion, I doubt Muslim Spain would have survived very long.
I know I said no more. *This one* will be my last.
'The cost to the sovereignty, dignity and cultural integrity of the natives might well be real and substantial, but it's only paid once (or twice for those who converted back again in the 13th-14th century?)'
By the converts yeah--but by those who never apostasised it was paid inter-generationally.
'I believe the answer (purely speculative on my part, of course) is no. With no widespread conversion, I doubt Muslim Spain would have survived very long.'
This vindicates F-M's chief thesis: Andalusia was neither multicultural nor a paradise. Without absorption of a fairly large number of 'elite' natives into the Umma, and the systematic subjection of their former co-ethnics to the status of a disarmed flock (the very word is used by Muslims) to be milked for tax and plunder, there could have been no 'glorious multicultural Andalusia'.
Interesting. However I'm disturbed by you placing the "fitna" (never read that term before except for the Shia-Sunni split) or the collapse of the Cordoba Caliphate a century before it actually happened. A simple excursion to Wikipedia will tell you that it collapsed ***in 1031*** and not 929, when the Caliphate did not even exist yet (it was the "independent Emirate"). 929 is when the Emirate becomes Caliphate under Abd al-Rahman III (Abderramán III in Spanish). That's a major error.
Ab al-Rahman was incidentally the most Basque Caliph ever: lots of his matrilineal ancestors were Basque (when I was in FB we estimated that he was well above 90% Basque by ancestry, even if also Arab by strict patrilineage). This reflects the policy of Cordoba Ummayad alliances with Pamplona (later called Navarre), which was around 1000 CE the most powerful Christian state in Iberia. Sancho III the Great was also Count of Castile by marriage (formerly part of León), Aragon (which was part of Pamplona Kingdom as such), Sobrarbe and Ribagorza (formerly part of the Spanish Marche of the Franks). He also became overlord of the Duchy of Gascony (previously under West Francia, alias France) and occupied militarily much of León (but not Galicia, which supported a rival claimant to the Leonese throne). He was even called "imperator hispaniae" (Emperor of the Spains) by bootlicking chroniclers (who also pompously compared Pamplona to ancient Rome).
Pamplona went into "fitna" almost synchronously with the Cordoba Caliphate, in 1035. Sancho's "empire" was divided among his four sons: García, the elder, became King of Pamplona, Ferdinand, the second-born, had already been appointed as Count of Castile, the third legitimate son, Gonzalo became Count of Ribagorza and Sobrarbe and the bastard Ramiro became Count of Aragon (Jaca district), directly under Pamplonese sovereignty. The partition did not last: Gonzalo died soon afterwards (date is unclear but could have been as early as 1035, before 1040 in any case) and Ramiro took over the Pyrenean counties. Then Ferdinand defeated and killed him at Atapuerca (then the border between Pamplona and Castile, just NE of Burgos) in 1054. Pamplona lingered some decades more but it was finally partitioned between Castile (which got most of the Western Basque Country and La Rioja) and Aragon, which got what would be later called Navarre.
It would be under the line of Ramiro, especially with Alfonso the Battler (1104-34), when Navarre re-expanded westwards (and also southwards to Tudela), but Aragon got the best prize: Zaragoza, via a regional crusade backed by many Occitan lords. He died heirless and wanted to donate the whole realm to the Templars but his will was overriden by the separate cortes (parliaments) of Navarre and Aragon and two different relatives were elected as kings instead. Later on, in a short treacherous war waged by Castile in 1199-1200, the Western Basque Country was conquered by these. However, as the previous conquest had caused many uprisings, this time especial autonomous status was given to the three provinces (Alaba and Biscay existed previously as Navarrese counties, Gipuzkoa was founded then), which allowed the Navarrese legal code and democratic self-rule to persist until today in some limited aspects or until the 1830s or 1870s (Carlist Wars) in others.
My understanding is that Castile, especially after the conquest of León (and independence of Portugal, related events) had become so massively powerful that it just went on rampage: first forcing the abdication of their own vassal, the Emir of Toledo (who was placed as Emir of Valencia), then against Navarre and finally against the Berber jihadists, which could only do so much in the long term. Aragon also became even stronger as it went to the House of Barcelona when Alfonso the Battler's niece Petronila married Ramón Berenguer IV. Both Aragon-Catalonia and Portugal then operated pretty much as the sidekicks of Castile-León and they were unstoppable. The rest, as they say, is History.
I don't see where in the post I said (did I imply it?) that the Cordoban Fitna happened in 929. Maybe I should have spent a few paragraphs writing about the Fitna to give more context, but I chose to focus on it's consequences and in how it clearly divides Iberian history into a before and after period."
'Pamplona went into "fitna" almost synchronously with the Cordoba Caliphate, in 1035. Sancho's "empire" was divided among his four sons,'
This is a great point. I should probably gather all the relevant data before making any statement, but based on what I've read, my impression is that it was during the (late?) 11th century that Christian kings stopped partitioning their inheritance, and thereby putting each successor in a weaker position as rulers of smaller kingdoms (also wars among siblings).
"This reflects the policy of Cordoba Ummayad alliances with Pamplona"
Also, I believe basque women had a (deservedly in my opinion) reputation for beauty in the caliphal court (kind of like Circassians in the Ottoman court?).
"My understanding is that Castile, especially after the conquest of León (and independence of Portugal, related events) had become so massively powerful"
Yet Castile-León was still demographically weaker than Almoravid al-Andalus and (probably) Almohad al-Andalus. And the Crown of Aragon was, of course, even smaller.
It's in the timeline graph of Avieta (which is quite wrong), you also say later (although I was paying less attention by then). Later on you said it happened in 1009-31, which seems correct, I was paying much less attention by then (it's close to the end of the article).
Basque women are probably not that beautiful... but they have strong character. In any case it was about alliances between the two dominant powers of the region, as Pamplona grew quite strong and was often confronted with León.
Pamplona was not a typical feudal state and was generally not divided in inheritance, what happened after Sancho III was rather unusual and mostly refers to the politics of "out of Pamplona", especially Castile. In fact the Pamplona that García inherited was the largest ever as such state and a historical reference for Basque/Navarrese nationalism.
For what I've read, Pamplonese counties like Alaba or Biscay were not "owned" by the counts but these were rather appointed by the King and Court. The King himself was often appointed by the Court or Army, as happened after Atapuerca battle, when the Army rejected Ferdinand's claim. This lower level of feudalism in Pamplona/Navarre resulted in many lords, especially in La Rioja, siding with Castile, which offered them a much better feudalist deal. The most notorious case is of course that of the lords of Haro, who managed to become also lords of Biscay and strike the deal of Western Basque self-rule in 1200. However their descendants would be killed by the Kings of Castile later on in a dispute over rights, as Castile became more and more absolutist, and thus Biscay's lordship went to the Castilian crown (the self-rule remained for many centuries however).
Al Andalus was overall much stronger than any of the northern realms (or even all them together) but, as you correctly point out, these had the support of other Europeans (and West Europe was always much stronger than North Africa, the Middle East is far away and could barely help at all). Once the crusades began, or rather soon afterwards, much of that energy ended in Iberia (notably the Lisbon Crusade but also the many military orders made in imitation of the ones in Palestine). Anyhow, Castile-León was quite big. Today it has lost much of its population but in the 19th century it was still quite densely inhabited (major wheat and cattle producer in those days, also many chartered cities and even universities). The 2nd Industrial Revolution changed that quite a bit.
Now that I took a better look at Aveta's graph, you're right, it seems to imply that the Caliphate ended in 929. Will replace it by my own graph [UPDATED!]. Thanks!
And excelent summary.
"Anyhow, Castile-León was quite big. Today it has lost much of its population but in the 19th century it was still quite densely inhabited"
I would only that in the context of the middle ages, the population density of CL seems to have increased quite a bit from what was probably a very low level before the fall of the Caliphate to the time of the Almoravids. Before the Caliphate's fall most of the Duero valley north of the Sierra de Guadarrama was "nominally" in the hands of CL, but population was mostly concentrated in the few fortified places that could resist the frequent Muslim razias. Probably largely living off cattle and herding, and avoiding agriculture. During the 11th century, Castile-León's southern border didn't advance much, but population density in the Duero valley increased now that it was a much safer place to live in.
Even in the 19th century, Castile-León was very much densely populated. It also happened in my own Basque Country, where the southern Mediterranean (by climate) provinces were more populated than the coastal Atlantic ones... until the Carlist Wars (1st in the 1830s, 2nd/3rd in the 1870s). Part of this shift was because of the moving of the tax boundary from the Ebro to the coast (smuggling makes people rich) but also, most notably, because agriculture lost economic weight and industry became the new thing, and the industry was not built in the old centers but in new ones like my own hometown of Bilbao, blessed or cursed by huge top quality iron ore deposits and an excellent port route between Castile and Western Europe.
Traditionally Castile-León was a major producer of wheat and livestock (incl. wool but also meat). Nowadays it can't compete with the major global food producers like the USA or Russia but in the past it was a rather rich agricultural area. Even today they are important food producers in terms industrial (dairies, cookies, you name it, it's mostly produced in Castile-León), until a decade ago or so they were also producing a lot of furniture but then came Ikea and destroyed them.
Informative and interesting article--and in my opinion *not* too long...
'In fact, the depletion of al-Andalus’ elite was so severe that Habbus al-Muzaffar, King of the Taifa of Granada - one of the several Muslim kingdoms established after the fall of the Caliphate of Cordoba - had to appoint a Jew - Samuel ibn Naghrillah, himself a refugee from Cordoba - as his Vizier, breaking with the long-standing Muslim tradition against appointing Jewish subjects to positions of power'
This is one interpretation. Couldn't it also have been that the Jews had rendered exceptional assistance to the king, as they had previously rendered an exceptional disservice to the Visigoths in opening the gates of Toledo to the Muslims a few hundred years before?
I have doubts about the degree to which HHC was wielded by the Iberian Muslims themselves. Dario Fernandez-Morera's book Myth of the Andalusian Paradise argues that Muslim achievements in science, engineering, literature etc are overstated and that they depended heavily on native Spanish (and Jewish) brains in the service of Muslim lords. By your reckoning this too would be a form of 'cheating'.
I don't fully understand what explanation you are proposing for Zaragoza's superior position relative to the other post-Taifa Muslim states. I take you to mean it was because of 'cheating'--proximity to the HHC Christian Aragonese--rather than the HHC the Muslim Zaragozans themseves possessed. Or have I misunderstood?
NB: By no means do I pretend to any great learning on this subject; but I am interested in it.
"This is one interpretation."
Yes, of course. Though I still find it intriguing that al-Muzaffar would appoint Samuel to such a high post (the highest), instead of assigning him to a useful but less powerful position, and that it would happen so soon after the Fitna.
I agree with Fernandez-Morera in the sense that Berber and Arab Muslim lords depended heavily on native Spanish, yet Muslim, brains. Assuming that's what Fernandez-Morera (I haven't read him, will do) says, I'm not sure I would qualify that as 'cheating', as they were not importing HHC (or troops) from outside their realm. Already by the 10th century (as Luis Aldamiz notices in another comment) Muslim leaders were to a large degree the descendants of natives, and many notable Andalusian families of "Arab" stock had likely faked their Arab pedigree simply because it was more prestigious than a native background at the time.
I intend to write a follow-up post on the Taifa of Zaragoza (currently reading some material), but to summarize, I believe it is the HHC the Muslim Zaragozans themselves possessed. I think the distribution of human capital, and it's relative abundance or scarcity, in 11th century Spain was not much different from what it is now. And the territories of both Christian Aragon (current province of Huesca) and the Taifa of Zaragoza (current provinces of Huesca, Zaragoza, Teruel, and even large parts of Lleida and Tarragona) correspond to provinces with pretty high GDP per capita (and HDI) among Spanish provinces, as of today.
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_lists_of_Spanish_autonomous_communities#/media/File:Annual_median_per-capita_income_by_Spanish_province,_2021.svg)
PS: I edited the part about cheating. After reading your comment I realized it wasn't very clear (thanks!). Hope it's more intelligible now.
Maybe the Jews supplied finance or other help during the fitna on such a scale as to render quite proportionate Samuel's extraordinary elevation. Eh I'm just speculating; you might well be right.
Yes I've read that there were many converts to Islam among the Spaniards. I didn't realise it was as common as you say, but if it was Fernandez-Morero is even more right than I thought he was. It always seemed strange to me that the very near descendants of a bunch of desert tribesmen, allied with primitive tribesmen of the Atlas, could produce such achievements (even if they have been exaggerated) so soon after they had irrupted from the Arabian interior. Absorption of the much more cultured Visigothic-Spanish natives is the best explanation. Do you know whether the Zaragozan king was himself a Christian convert?
F-M's main thesis, of course, is that none of the achievements of Andalusia were accomplished in the midst of a Vibrant and Diverse and Mostly Peaceful multicultural society: the Christians *had to* convert, at least in appearance in order to lend their higher culture to the Muslim states. Incidentally, I wonder if anybody has looked into the degree to which the first fitna might have been in part a pseudo-ethnic conflict between recent converts and the core Arab-Berber stock...
By the way: I have seen the famed mosque at Cordoba. While it is impressive in scale and has a very distinctive and magical atmosphere, as a feat of engineering it is not that great; similarly the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, which to me is mainly remarkable for having been built inside a Roman temple. Really the impact and distinction of both buildings derives from the fact that they're examples of harmonious architectural accretion, which was in both cases was the product not of harmonious multiculturalism but of outright violent conquest and the subordination of one faith to another.
Point taken about 'cheating'; my apologies if I came across as unnecessarily critical on a minor point.
Even considering the Visigothic-Spanish as the descendants of classical Rome, I'm not 100% convinced they were more cultured than the Arabs (maybe than the Berbers?) at the time of the conquest, in the 8th century.
The Arabs established what looks like a much more sophisticated state than the one operated by the Visigoths. But then again, you could accuse the Arabs of largely copying the Byzantine model.
Maybe the merit of the Arab caliphate was to utilize the full (high) potential of native Spaniards in a way that the Visigoths had not managed to achieve?
About the Zaragozan rulers, the late (11th century) Zaragozan dynasties (Tujibids, Banu Hud) claimed Arab descent (though there's a difference between claiming and actually being). But some of the early rulers of Zaragoza and nearby areas were of native stock:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_al-Tawil_of_Huesca (even married the daughter of the Christian Count of Aragon)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amrus_ibn_Yusuf
And most famously, the Banu Qasi, who ruled Zaragoza almost autonomously for more than a century: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banu_Qasi (and who also married Christian noble wives).
PS: I don't mind criticism. One of my main motivations for writing this Substack is to get feedback, comments and pushback on what I write.
I'm conscious that there's a fine line between being a vexatious quibbler and an informed commentator of real value, and I'm not certain that my remarks fit into the latter category. so I will make this one my last on this thread.
'Even considering the Visigothic-Spanish as the descendants of classical Rome, I'm not 100% convinced they were more cultured than the Arabs (maybe than the Berbers?) at the time of the conquest, in the 8th century.'
F-M seems to think that they were and that they were on the ascent culturally before the invasion. Disunity was their enemy, but this has been a feature of Spanish polities since at least the Iron Age, not excluding the Muslims or the Spain of the present, and is not fairly regarded as a bug uniquely afflicting Visigothic society. At any rate the state of Visigothic culture at the Muslim invasion is traduced unfairly by the 'Ammmmmmaaaazing Multicultural Islamic Spain' school of thought.
'The Arabs established what looks like a much more sophisticated state than the one operated by the Visigoths. But then again, you could accuse the Arabs of largely copying the Byzantine model.'
Yes one could--with the *indispensible* assistance of the Spanish (ex-)Christians.
'Maybe the merit of the Arab caliphate was to utilize the full (high) potential of native Spaniards in a way that the Visigoths had not managed to achieve?'
Maybe yeah--but at what cost to the sovereignty, dignity and cultural integrity of the natives? Also this seems to me an unattractively sterile and instrumentalist way of looking at humanity and history; I have the same misgivings about 'EHC' centred schemata in general (cf. recent dispute over H1B visas in America).
It's fascinating that so many noble Muslim families (and even potentates) were Visigothic-Spanish in origin. I wonder what effects this fact might have had on the stability of the state. Was there really a true modus vivendi between the Spanish converts and the Arab and Berber Muslims? Were the Visigoth converts really as *down with the program' as one is supposed to believe? Could such cultural lift-off as there was in Muslim Spain have been achieved without widespread (only half sincere?) conversion by the Spaniards? Is there a case for regarding the Almoravid invasion as in part an ethnoreligious re-conquest? Am I WAY OFF in even suggesting these possibilities?
"F-M seems to think that they were and that they were on the ascent culturally before the invasion"
That's interesting. I haven't reached the part of F-M when he talks about that (I'm barely around page 30). But regarding conversion I'll quote F-M:
"According to this line of thinking, if the Christians did not see the invaders as Muslims, they could not have seen the invasion as a religious confrontation. Thus the Muslim “expansion” would have been motivated by material rather than religious reasons... There are several problems with this argument. First, it overlooks the fact that Muslim chronicles of the Muslim conquests portray jihad as Holy War...The historian Ibn al-Qutiyya (d. 977), who was of Visigoth ancestry, narrates how one of the Muslim commanders was inspired by his dreaming of Muhammad and His Companions, with their drawn swords, entering Spain."
Did al-Qutiyya think of himself as a convert? Some (most?) of his ancestors must have thought of themselves as converts, and were probably seen by others - Muslim and Christian alike - as converts. Yet once enough generations have passed, the descendants of converts will no longer think of themselves as converts, and given enough conversions and enough intermarriage (many "Arab" Andalusis likely had a few real Arab ancestors - 3 out of 32?, 4 out of 64? - but were mostly native Spaniards) to develop into a substantial minority (or even majority) the descendants of converts will probably think of themselves as natives, regardless of their affiliation with the newer religion.
The cost to the sovereignty, dignity and cultural integrity of the natives might well be real and substantial, but it's only paid once (or twice for those who converted back again in the 13th-14th century?). An 11th or 12th century Muslim Spaniard had not only forgotten whatever pain and trauma the Muslim conquest and subsequent (insincere at first, sure) conversion had inflicted on his/her ancestors, but was probably actively trying to pass for a descendant of Arabs. Remember, Berbers kept their Berber language, Persians kept their Persian language, but Muslim Spaniards wholeheartedly adopted Arabic.
If there was a problem between different Muslim communities, it was likely between Berbers (maybe Saqalibs/slaves) and Andalusis (everyone else).
"Could such cultural lift-off as there was in Muslim Spain have been achieved without widespread (only half sincere?) conversion by the Spaniards?"
I believe the answer (purely speculative on my part, of course) is no. With no widespread conversion, I doubt Muslim Spain would have survived very long.
I know I said no more. *This one* will be my last.
'The cost to the sovereignty, dignity and cultural integrity of the natives might well be real and substantial, but it's only paid once (or twice for those who converted back again in the 13th-14th century?)'
By the converts yeah--but by those who never apostasised it was paid inter-generationally.
'I believe the answer (purely speculative on my part, of course) is no. With no widespread conversion, I doubt Muslim Spain would have survived very long.'
This vindicates F-M's chief thesis: Andalusia was neither multicultural nor a paradise. Without absorption of a fairly large number of 'elite' natives into the Umma, and the systematic subjection of their former co-ethnics to the status of a disarmed flock (the very word is used by Muslims) to be milked for tax and plunder, there could have been no 'glorious multicultural Andalusia'.
Interesting. However I'm disturbed by you placing the "fitna" (never read that term before except for the Shia-Sunni split) or the collapse of the Cordoba Caliphate a century before it actually happened. A simple excursion to Wikipedia will tell you that it collapsed ***in 1031*** and not 929, when the Caliphate did not even exist yet (it was the "independent Emirate"). 929 is when the Emirate becomes Caliphate under Abd al-Rahman III (Abderramán III in Spanish). That's a major error.
Ab al-Rahman was incidentally the most Basque Caliph ever: lots of his matrilineal ancestors were Basque (when I was in FB we estimated that he was well above 90% Basque by ancestry, even if also Arab by strict patrilineage). This reflects the policy of Cordoba Ummayad alliances with Pamplona (later called Navarre), which was around 1000 CE the most powerful Christian state in Iberia. Sancho III the Great was also Count of Castile by marriage (formerly part of León), Aragon (which was part of Pamplona Kingdom as such), Sobrarbe and Ribagorza (formerly part of the Spanish Marche of the Franks). He also became overlord of the Duchy of Gascony (previously under West Francia, alias France) and occupied militarily much of León (but not Galicia, which supported a rival claimant to the Leonese throne). He was even called "imperator hispaniae" (Emperor of the Spains) by bootlicking chroniclers (who also pompously compared Pamplona to ancient Rome).
Pamplona went into "fitna" almost synchronously with the Cordoba Caliphate, in 1035. Sancho's "empire" was divided among his four sons: García, the elder, became King of Pamplona, Ferdinand, the second-born, had already been appointed as Count of Castile, the third legitimate son, Gonzalo became Count of Ribagorza and Sobrarbe and the bastard Ramiro became Count of Aragon (Jaca district), directly under Pamplonese sovereignty. The partition did not last: Gonzalo died soon afterwards (date is unclear but could have been as early as 1035, before 1040 in any case) and Ramiro took over the Pyrenean counties. Then Ferdinand defeated and killed him at Atapuerca (then the border between Pamplona and Castile, just NE of Burgos) in 1054. Pamplona lingered some decades more but it was finally partitioned between Castile (which got most of the Western Basque Country and La Rioja) and Aragon, which got what would be later called Navarre.
It would be under the line of Ramiro, especially with Alfonso the Battler (1104-34), when Navarre re-expanded westwards (and also southwards to Tudela), but Aragon got the best prize: Zaragoza, via a regional crusade backed by many Occitan lords. He died heirless and wanted to donate the whole realm to the Templars but his will was overriden by the separate cortes (parliaments) of Navarre and Aragon and two different relatives were elected as kings instead. Later on, in a short treacherous war waged by Castile in 1199-1200, the Western Basque Country was conquered by these. However, as the previous conquest had caused many uprisings, this time especial autonomous status was given to the three provinces (Alaba and Biscay existed previously as Navarrese counties, Gipuzkoa was founded then), which allowed the Navarrese legal code and democratic self-rule to persist until today in some limited aspects or until the 1830s or 1870s (Carlist Wars) in others.
My understanding is that Castile, especially after the conquest of León (and independence of Portugal, related events) had become so massively powerful that it just went on rampage: first forcing the abdication of their own vassal, the Emir of Toledo (who was placed as Emir of Valencia), then against Navarre and finally against the Berber jihadists, which could only do so much in the long term. Aragon also became even stronger as it went to the House of Barcelona when Alfonso the Battler's niece Petronila married Ramón Berenguer IV. Both Aragon-Catalonia and Portugal then operated pretty much as the sidekicks of Castile-León and they were unstoppable. The rest, as they say, is History.
I don't see where in the post I said (did I imply it?) that the Cordoban Fitna happened in 929. Maybe I should have spent a few paragraphs writing about the Fitna to give more context, but I chose to focus on it's consequences and in how it clearly divides Iberian history into a before and after period."
'Pamplona went into "fitna" almost synchronously with the Cordoba Caliphate, in 1035. Sancho's "empire" was divided among his four sons,'
This is a great point. I should probably gather all the relevant data before making any statement, but based on what I've read, my impression is that it was during the (late?) 11th century that Christian kings stopped partitioning their inheritance, and thereby putting each successor in a weaker position as rulers of smaller kingdoms (also wars among siblings).
"This reflects the policy of Cordoba Ummayad alliances with Pamplona"
Also, I believe basque women had a (deservedly in my opinion) reputation for beauty in the caliphal court (kind of like Circassians in the Ottoman court?).
"My understanding is that Castile, especially after the conquest of León (and independence of Portugal, related events) had become so massively powerful"
Yet Castile-León was still demographically weaker than Almoravid al-Andalus and (probably) Almohad al-Andalus. And the Crown of Aragon was, of course, even smaller.
It's in the timeline graph of Avieta (which is quite wrong), you also say later (although I was paying less attention by then). Later on you said it happened in 1009-31, which seems correct, I was paying much less attention by then (it's close to the end of the article).
Basque women are probably not that beautiful... but they have strong character. In any case it was about alliances between the two dominant powers of the region, as Pamplona grew quite strong and was often confronted with León.
Pamplona was not a typical feudal state and was generally not divided in inheritance, what happened after Sancho III was rather unusual and mostly refers to the politics of "out of Pamplona", especially Castile. In fact the Pamplona that García inherited was the largest ever as such state and a historical reference for Basque/Navarrese nationalism.
For what I've read, Pamplonese counties like Alaba or Biscay were not "owned" by the counts but these were rather appointed by the King and Court. The King himself was often appointed by the Court or Army, as happened after Atapuerca battle, when the Army rejected Ferdinand's claim. This lower level of feudalism in Pamplona/Navarre resulted in many lords, especially in La Rioja, siding with Castile, which offered them a much better feudalist deal. The most notorious case is of course that of the lords of Haro, who managed to become also lords of Biscay and strike the deal of Western Basque self-rule in 1200. However their descendants would be killed by the Kings of Castile later on in a dispute over rights, as Castile became more and more absolutist, and thus Biscay's lordship went to the Castilian crown (the self-rule remained for many centuries however).
Al Andalus was overall much stronger than any of the northern realms (or even all them together) but, as you correctly point out, these had the support of other Europeans (and West Europe was always much stronger than North Africa, the Middle East is far away and could barely help at all). Once the crusades began, or rather soon afterwards, much of that energy ended in Iberia (notably the Lisbon Crusade but also the many military orders made in imitation of the ones in Palestine). Anyhow, Castile-León was quite big. Today it has lost much of its population but in the 19th century it was still quite densely inhabited (major wheat and cattle producer in those days, also many chartered cities and even universities). The 2nd Industrial Revolution changed that quite a bit.
Now that I took a better look at Aveta's graph, you're right, it seems to imply that the Caliphate ended in 929. Will replace it by my own graph [UPDATED!]. Thanks!
And excelent summary.
"Anyhow, Castile-León was quite big. Today it has lost much of its population but in the 19th century it was still quite densely inhabited"
I would only that in the context of the middle ages, the population density of CL seems to have increased quite a bit from what was probably a very low level before the fall of the Caliphate to the time of the Almoravids. Before the Caliphate's fall most of the Duero valley north of the Sierra de Guadarrama was "nominally" in the hands of CL, but population was mostly concentrated in the few fortified places that could resist the frequent Muslim razias. Probably largely living off cattle and herding, and avoiding agriculture. During the 11th century, Castile-León's southern border didn't advance much, but population density in the Duero valley increased now that it was a much safer place to live in.
Even in the 19th century, Castile-León was very much densely populated. It also happened in my own Basque Country, where the southern Mediterranean (by climate) provinces were more populated than the coastal Atlantic ones... until the Carlist Wars (1st in the 1830s, 2nd/3rd in the 1870s). Part of this shift was because of the moving of the tax boundary from the Ebro to the coast (smuggling makes people rich) but also, most notably, because agriculture lost economic weight and industry became the new thing, and the industry was not built in the old centers but in new ones like my own hometown of Bilbao, blessed or cursed by huge top quality iron ore deposits and an excellent port route between Castile and Western Europe.
Traditionally Castile-León was a major producer of wheat and livestock (incl. wool but also meat). Nowadays it can't compete with the major global food producers like the USA or Russia but in the past it was a rather rich agricultural area. Even today they are important food producers in terms industrial (dairies, cookies, you name it, it's mostly produced in Castile-León), until a decade ago or so they were also producing a lot of furniture but then came Ikea and destroyed them.