In that post I outlined some of the most prominent traits and events of the rule of each of the three Somoza family members: the patriarch, Anastasio Somoza García (Somoza García); the elder son, Luis Somoza Debayle (Luis S.D.); and younger son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle (ASol D). Here’s a very simple timeline showing the period of rule of each of these three Nicaraguan rulers:

Due to space constraints, I omitted some significant events in the previous post. One of the aims of this post is to address those omissions and provide a more comprehensive overview of the Somoza regime(s).

When Mena's rebellion broke out in Nicaragua, in 1912, Somoza García was just 16 years old. The conflict saw conservative General Luis Mena leading a coalition of conservatives and liberals against liberal President Juan José Estrada1 and his successor, the conservative Adolfo Díaz. These events ultimately led to a reaction by the United States2:

In mid-1912 Mena persuaded the Nicaraguan national assembly to [unconstitutionally] name him successor to Díaz when Díaz's term expired in 1913. When the United States refused to recognize the Nicaraguan assembly's decision, Mena rebelled against the Díaz government.

After Mena’s unconstitutional appointment by the Nicaraguan National Assembly Mena, his forces seized U.S. steamers, which were the property of U.S. nationals, and posed a threat to the American-owned railway from Corinto to Granada3. This provided the United States with a pretext to intervene militarily in the country4:

Navy and Marine forces operated in the field during the period August-November 1912. 42 officers and 1,030 sailors from seven ships; 43 officers and 1,272 Marines, most of whom were from battalion organizations.

That small force of 2,350 marines and sailors was enough to suppress the rebellion. In just two months the rebellion was over:

On October 23, Southerland announced that but for the Nicaraguan elections in early November, he would withdraw most of the U.S. landing forces. At that point, peaceful conditions prevailed and nearly all of the embarked U.S. Marines and bluejackets… withdrew, leaving a legation guard of 100 Marines in Managua.

Those 100 marines were the tangible manifestation of American occupation of Nicaragua, while U.S. control of Nicaragua's customs duties5 constituted the economic manifestation of this prolonged influence. They would stay in Nicaragua until January 1925.

And what were the long-term objectives of occupation?

First of all, the Conservatives retained their precarious hold on the Presidency, but their power rested on the presence of a strong Marine detachment at the Managua legation…

The most important accomplishment, of course, was the bringing of peace to Nicaragua. Respite from war offered the nation a chance to raise the standards of living of its people, and pay its debts - in short to fulfill the altruistic purposes of Dollar Diplomacy. American investments were protected by Marines during the revolt, and afterward by the Diaz government. Last, but far from least, the United States had intervened with enough vigor to prove once again that no European encroachment in Central America would be tolerated.6

Conservative governments would be the norm for the next 13 years, and together with the Marine presence in Managua, this led many Nicaraguans to believe that the United States favored conservatives.

After those 13 years of conservative rule (1911-1924), the Nicaraguan people yearned for a change in leadership. Following a revision of electoral law, overseen by American advisers7, the path was cleared for the Liberal party to reach power. Confident in American pledges of a fair and honest election, Liberals participated in the 1924 elections and successfully elected Vice President Juan Bautista Sacasa as co-head of a coalition government with President Carlos Solórzano8:

The Vice President [Bartolomé Martínez] was known to have ambitions to succeed himself in office; and the Liberals, relying on the American promise of fair elections, pointed out to the United States that this would be illegal. The State Department informed them that no government which seized power in defiance of the constitution would be recognized. Satisfied, the Liberals turned their energies to winning the next election.

Alas, the Solórzano-Sacasa government was not going to last:

Approximately three weeks after the last of the Marines had left Nicaragua, a group of Liberal cabinet members sat down to a banquet in Managua to the sound of popping champagne corks. A band of Conservatives burst into the room, accused them of treason, and had the lot of them thrown into jail. The final blow fell on 25 October 1925, when the followers of the ultra-Conservative Emiliano Chamorro seized the fortifications on La Loma. President Solorzano and Vice President Sacasa prudently left the country. Purged of its Liberal members, the Nicaraguan congress was reorganized; and on 16 January 1926, Chamorro took over as President.9

In the aftermath of his coup, conservative General Chamorro10 soon encountered a significant obstacle in exercising the power he had seized by force:

It is therefore with regret that I have to inform you that the United States has not recognized and will not recognize as the Government of Nicaragua the régime now headed by General Chamorro, as the latter was duly advised on several occasions by the American Minister after General Chamorro had taken charge of the citadel at Managua on October 25th last. This action is, I am happy to learn, in accord with than taken by all governments that signed with Nicaragua the treaty of 1923.11

When Liberal sympathizers, led by Sacasa, resolved to challenge Chamorro’s regime by force, igniting the Constitutionalist War, the U.S. made efforts to mediate between the opposing factions. The American goal was to secure a mutual agreement on an interim president who could steer the nation back towards constitutional rule.

It was at this time when a young Anastasio Somoza García, the husband of Sacasa’s niece, became involved with the Liberal faction in the Constitutionalist War.

Somoza García

Under pressure from the United States, Chamorro resigned in November 1926. Following this, the Nicaraguan congress appointed former President Adolfo Díaz as the new President, who was promptly recognized as the legitimate ruler of Nicaragua by the U.S. Meanwhile, Sacasa, who had returned to Nicaragua with the aim of assuming the presidency, did not recognize Díaz's legitimacy.

The deployment of American forces to Nicaragua to support Díaz against the rebellion once again positioned the United States as siding with the Nicaraguan Conservatives in the eyes of the Nicaraguan Liberals.

Therefore it’s not surprising that Somoza García was part of the Liberal forces, led by General José María Moncada, fighting against the Americans. In fact, he was on the same side of the war as Augusto Sandino, who commanded a small force in the north of Nicaragua.

This is the same Augusto Sandino that would go on to inspire the Sandinista guerrilla decades later.

Eventually, the U.S. government successfully brokered a deal between the warring factions, leading to the signing of the Pact of Espino Negro to end the conflict. Under the terms of the accord, Díaz would remain as president until 1928, when new elections, overseen by the U.S., would be held. Additionally, American officers would train a new non-political, militarized police force called the National Guard.

The creation of the National Guard, initially trained and led by English-speaking American officers, proved to be a godsend for Somoza García. As one of the few Nicaraguan leaders with some military experience, strong connections within the Nicaraguan elite, and proficiency in English12, Somoza García capitalized on this opportunity to join and rapidly ascend the ranks of the Guard.

Sandino, on the other hand, responded to Nicaragua's return to constitutional normalcy13 by rejecting the Pact of Espino Negro and demanding the complete withdrawal of all American forces from the country.

After the last American marines were pulled out of Nicaragua in 1933, Sandino came up with new demands, or something:

Sandino was reported to have said that he would not turn over his arms to the Guardia Nacional because of the unconstitutionality of that organization… At the same time, if I may judge from the conversations I have had with [Doctor Salvador Calderón Ramirez], he is somewhat disillusioned, and has referred in disparaging tones to Sandino’s intellectual capacity for expressing his ideas. A similar opinion was expressed the other day by Doctor Léonardo Argüello, Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he stated that he carefully listened to Sandino talk for half an hour, but was unable afterwards to express any opinion concerning what had been said because he did not know what had been said. High officials in the Government have manifested an impatience because so much time has been and is being spent in long negotiations with such a person.14

I won't delve into the details of how Somoza García likely orchestrated the assassination of Sandino or how he later executed a coup in 1936 to depose President Juan Bautista Sacasa (who had succeeded President Moncada, elected in 1928). But I will remark that there was a widespread belief that the United States had a hand in Sandino's assassination during the years that followed.

In the words of Arthur Bliss Lane, the American ambassador to Nicaragua15:

I had not meant to indicate to the Department that the rumor is current that we favor Somoza for the Presidency. Such a rumor has not reached me and I do not find any record of having so informed the Department. The feeling exists, however, that we favor the Guardia as contrasted with the Government, such feeling being chiefly of the following:

(a) Our creation of the Guardia.

(b) My having seen a great deal of Somoza (it is not recalled that I have seen the President many more times nor is it generally known that I have acquainted him with every meeting I have had with Somoza).

(c) Silence as to our policy.

(d) Feeling in the United States against Sandino. (e) Moncada’s having lunched with me on February 21.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me this morning that it is not merely a matter of convincing Somoza but of convincing the whole Guardia which, according to him, is responsible for the circulation of the rumor that I am the intellectual author of the killing of Sandino. He said that the Guardia is convinced that I—and hence the United States Government—favors the Guardia as against the Government.

Mr. Dawson who had the opportunity to speak to persons who should be well informed in Colombia, Panama and Costa Rica, reports that the feeling seemed to be current in those countries not only that I conspired to bring about the assassination of Sandino but also that we are now supporting the Guardia Nacional, as contrasted with the Government.

The American-trained Guardia naturally assumed that their new boss was favored by the Americans. Yet this did not mean the United States had completely failed in its goal of creating a non-political military force for Nicaragua16:

But not all of the National Guard was in favor of Somoza, there were sectors of the officers who were loyal to President Sacasa, in the barracks of Corinto, Rivas and Managua. So, with the coup d'état, Somoza García wanted not only to overthrow the government but also to exercise total control over the National Guard.17

Once Somoza García was in power though, the National Guard would become inextricably intertwined with the regime.

As I mentioned in my previous Nicaragua post, the Truman administration withheld recognition of the Nicaraguan government, led by two successive figurehead Presidents handpicked by Somoza García, for an entire year in the aftermath of the dictator’s May 1947 coup. This again contradicts the notion that Somoza García was chosen or imposed by the U.S. as their man in Nicaragua.

And the eventual recognition of Somoza García’s man, Víctor Manuel Román y Reyes, was largely due to pressure from other American countries, such as the Dominican Republic18 and Costa Rica19:

The [Costa Rican] Picado administration was determined to cooperate with the other American republics in a common policy. He said, however, that the present non-recognition policy represents great sacrifice and very real danger for Costa Rica. He remarked that there is already disorder in Nicaragua and that internal cleavages are widening, and he predicted that the eventual result is likely to be civil war.

[Costa Rican] Ambassador Gutiérrez called attention to the common border of the two countries and asserted that civil strife in Nicaragua would inevitably have serious consequences in Costa Rica. He declared that in any armed struggle within Nicaragua the losers would attempt to flee to Costa Rica and that the forces of the stronger side would attempt to cross the border in pursuit.

[Costa Rican] Ambassador Gutiérrez remarked that in his opinion the non-recognition policy affects Costa Rica most seriously of any American republic and, after Costa Rica, the United States. He said that he realizes that instability in Nicaragua represents a constant preoccupation for the United States. In that connection, he made reference to previous instances of armed intervention by the United States in Nicaragua and said that he was confident that the United States would not wish to send troops into Nicaragua again. Mr. Armour in his reply to this statement made it clear that such a course would be completely out of the question and that it had not the slightest possibility of being entertained by this Government.

Additionally, it's noteworthy that Teodoro Picado, the Costa Rican President in the previous quote, was elected as the head of a political coalition that included the local communist party (PVP)20. This makes me doubt the notion that Somoza García’s recognition might have been contingent on his “anti-communism”.

Years later, in the aftermath of the 1956 assassination of Somoza García, the American diplomatic service continued to abide by a policy of withholding support from the dictator’s successor, his son Luis Somoza Debayle21:

Most groups in Nicaragua are believed friendly toward the United States…. Essential opposition friendliness has been somewhat tempered by the belief of many that the United States was “supporting” the Somoza regime. The demonstrations with regard to the medical aid to Somoza may have increased the bitterness of those who were already bitter, and might be used to convince some of those who were more or less on the line that the United States is against them…If the U.S. gives the appearance of supporting Luis Somoza, it will be taken as a sign that we are continuing to deny opposition aspirations…It would be a convenient basis for communist propaganda.

On the other hand, if we do not give the appearance of wholehearted support to Luis we might lose in some circles.

…there are, I believe, three general policies which can be followed:

1. Careful non-intervention with a sufficient, carefully-conceived build-up to get this across prior to elections.

2. Calculated support for Luis Somoza on the basis that Luis will get himself elected anyway and the Guardia will stave off trouble indefinitely.

3. Disguised intervention to the extent that we use our influence to try to mold Luis and Tachito; to persuade them to hold real elections with the hope of an orderly transition from the Somoza regime before something causes it to collapse anyway.

For these reasons it is believed that a careful policy of non-intervention would be preferable in the long run.

In a memorandum to Wollam, October 16, Rubottom22 wrote: “I believe that we should adopt the first of the alternatives you discuss, namely ‘careful non-intervention.’…”

Reading through the sources on Somoza García, he most definitely looks like an opportunist and a deceiver. But I see no evidence of Somoza García being America’s man, or America’s son of a b*tch if you will.

I’ve done a lot of reading for these last two posts on Nicaragua, and I want to thank everyone who has taken the time to read them. Reading so many sources takes a lot of time though, and I’m thinking of trying a different approach, by writing shorter, more frequent posts.

Also, you may have noticed that I’ve added a link to my Twitter/X account (@javiero08640650). I should probably make a better effort to promote this Substack, and being more active on Twtitter/X might be a good way to achieve that.

That policy is perceived as U.S. acceptance of any Latin American dictatorship as long as the dictator was friendly towards America, which, for most of the century, often entailed being against communism1.

I’m not going to argue against that notion. Numerous instances of American actions support the view that this was indeed American policy.

In this post, I aim to examine the idea that anti-American sentiment in Latin America was, at least partially, a response to the aforementioned U.S. foreign policy, whether Somoza in particular was a product of this policy, remaining in power through the active support of America, and whether the Sandinista guerilla (FSLN) was a reaction to Somoza’s despotic rule.

Let’s start with a bit of family history. The Somoza that Roosevelt supposedly mentioned was Anastasio Somoza García, who held sway over Nicaragua from 1936 until his assassination in 1956. He inaugurated a dynastic rule that would last for 43 years, carried on by his sons Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

To avoid any confusion2, I’ll use shortened forms when referring to the sons of Anastasio Somoza García, Luis and Anastasio. Luis Somoza Debayle will be Luis S.D. and Anastasio Somoza - the younger or little - Debayle will be A So the L. D., or ASol D. for short.

One significant fact worth noting is that the Somozas realized the convenience of occasionally letting someone loyal to them to assume the presidency, effectively delegating the daily governmental responsibilities. For instance, in the 1963 presidential election René Schick ran as the Nationalist Liberal Party (PLN) candidate3, and governed the country until his death on 3 August 1966, even though the Somoza brothers maintained paramount power. After Schick’s death, he was succeeded by Lorenzo Guerrero who completed the original term in May 1967.

Nicaraguan politics in the early 20th century was dominated by two major political factions, Liberals and Conservatives, with the former ones grouped around the aforementioned PLN4 and the latter around the Conservative Party. These parties not only embodied the traditional ideologies of classical liberalism and conservatism but also represented the interests of the elites of Nicaragua’s two main cities at the time, the liberal León and the conservative Granada.

Several years before becoming the big man of Nicaragua, in 1919, Somoza García married Salvadora Debayle, the niece of future liberal president Juan Bautista Sacasa, thereby aligning himself with the left-wing Nicaraguan politics of the time, which were represented by the Liberal Party.

He would go on to fight as a general for the liberal side in the 1926 rebellion against conservative general, and coup leader, Emiliano Chamorro. This rebellion culminated in a U.S.-mediated peace agreement between Liberals and Conservatives, paving the way for José María Moncada, a Liberal politician, to assume the presidency in January 1929, right on time to preside over the difficult years of the Great Depression.

Moncada's presidency was marked by a significant economic downturn, with Nicaragua's GDP experiencing a decline of approximately one-third. These catastrophic economic conditions persisted under his successor, Juan Bautista Sacasa, who was elected in 1932 and appointed his relative, Somoza García, as head of the Nicaraguan National Guard, a military force established to suppress the caudillo-led regional militias that had caused so much instability in Nicaragua during the preceding decade.

By the time Somoza executed his infamous 1936 coup, the first of two, Nicaragua’s per capita income was still more than 40% lower than what it had been before the Great Depression. Under those conditions and considering his rule over the National Guard it’s no surprise that Somoza was able to seize power in 1936.

But how did he manage to stay in power for the next 20 years?

The following chart comparing Nicaragua’s per capita income to those of its Central American neighbors might shed some light on that question.

You can see in the previous chart that during the rule of Somoza García (1936-1956), Nicaragua moved from the poor Central American countries group to the richer Central American countries group. The fact that income doubled during those 20 years might go a long way towards explaining why Somoza García managed to hold on to power for so long, without having to face much popular opposition to his government. In fact, he largely co-opted the Nicaraguan left and labor movements5:

after the assassination of Sandino on February 21, 1934, a part of the PTN [Partido Trabajador Nicaragüense] leadership began to slowly turn towards General Anastasio Somoza, who aiming to seize power, embraced a discourse in favor of the rights of workers and therefore “social justice”.6

And after seizing power, he continued his efforts to co-opt the labor movement for at least a decade or more. It’s revealing that during the massive demonstrations against Somoza García in June and July 1944, led by students and the newly formed Independent Liberal Party (PLI)7, the Nicaragua Socialist Party (PSN) opposed the demonstrations8, dismissing them as public order agitation.

The Nicaraguan right was also co-opted by Somoza García. As head of the National Liberal Party, he engaged in negotiations with the opposition Conservative Party, leading to a power-sharing agreement that granted Conservatives the role of official opposition in April 1950.

The agreement was known as the pact of the Generals because those who signed it were Somoza García as head of the liberals and General Emiliano Chamorro as head of the Conservative Party. Chamorro had led an insurrection against the regime in September 1947, which was a reaction to a previous May 1947 coup orchestrated by Somoza García.

Why did Somoza García execute a coup in May 1947, when he was already the paramount leader of the country?

Well, after a decade in power even Somoza García’s Liberal Party colleagues were growing weary of his leadership and wanted a different party candidate for the 1947 presidential election9. Somoza acquiesced but still leveraged his influence to select a malleable candidate, Dr. Leonardo Argüello. However, this maneuver backfired as soon as Argüello took office:

I will not be, by the way, a simple figurehead.

Somoza García took issue with this statement by Argüello and had him unceremoniously deposed and exiled.

The U.S. did not approve of the coup and withheld recognition of the new president, or more properly, the new figurehead president, Benjamín Lacayo Sacasa, and his successor Víctor Manuel Román y Reyes until May 194810.

After his “victory” in the May 1950 election, Somoza García found himself largely free from the concerns of having to deal with an organized opposition for the next few years11. Not coincidentally, this period was marked by a notable rise in per capita income, averaging an increase of 5% per year.

The Luis S.D. era

The year Somoza García was assassinated, 1956, Nicaragua entered a period of very low economic growth that persisted until 1961. During this period his sons Luis Somoza Debayle (Luis S.D.) and Anastasio Somoza Debayle would take the reins of the country, with the elder brother Luis assuming the presidency (1957-1963), while the younger brother Anastasio (ASol D) assumed as Chief of the National Guard.

By the time Luis S.D. left the presidency in the hands of René Schick12, Nicaragua was on its path to becoming the second wealthiest country in Central America13, and the Sandinista guerrilla - founded in 1961 but preceded by several revolutionary and guerrilla movements in 1958, 1959 and 1960 - was on its way to becoming irrelevant14.

After a couple of years of guerrilla activity, the National Guard got the upper hand on the Sandinistas:

Between 1963 and 1967 a policy of conciliation [by the FSLN] and working alongside the traditional left was carried out, but it did not obtain results. [The FSLN] made the most of those years to, on the other hand, carry out important experiences within the popular masses and ties with the poor peasantry.15

There wasn't much action. A few years later, things hadn’t improved for the Sandinistas:

In 1970, ... the FSLN launched the slogan of silently accumulating forces, reducing war actions to a minimum16.

From the fray of battle to launching slogans. The armed struggle can wait for a better time.

Coincidentally, according to the U.S. ambassador in Nicaragua, Luis S.D. was taking his job seriously17:

[Luis S.D.] takes his presidential duties seriously, listens to advice and does not make the same mistake twice. He is decentralizing the Government and giving his Cabinet Ministers and department heads increased authority and backing up their decisions. He has eliminated some of the rackets and is removing dead wood from Government payrolls. About one thousand employees have been dropped by the railroad alone. By eliminating the political hacks he plans on saving about three million dollars a year… In short, he has been cleaning house a little too rapidly which is not always politically wise, and as a result he will probably slow up the process temporarily

Luis S.D., apparently unaware of his role as right-wing Latin American dictator, even dabbled in communism:

The President and his Government continue to be friendly to the United States. The Foreign Minister and the Minister of Agriculture are quite nationalistic. They, along with several others, think a little bit of Communism would be a good thing because it would make the United States a little more liberal18

This little bit of communism might refer to Nicaragua’s limited land reform, started in 196419, with the founding of the Nicaraguan Agrarian Institute (IAN)20. A little bit of redistributionism never hurt anyone.

But then, at the same time as Nicaragua’s 1960s economic boom was winding down in 1967, Luis S.D. died due to a heart attack. His death left his younger brother, ASol D, who had recently won the presidential election, in charge of the country.

ASol D takes charge

Riding on the coattails of the 1960s economic boom, ASol D gained further approval from the Nicaraguan people by signing the abolition of the 1916 Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in July 1970. This treaty granted the U.S. full rights over any future canal built through Nicaragua, a condition widely perceived by Nicaraguans as infringing upon their sovereignty.

However, ASol D's fortunes would eventually decline. In addition to the lack of economic growth that characterized the period from 1967 to 1972, the 1972 Nicaragua earthquake struck a devastating blow, causing extensive damage and destruction to significant parts of the capital city, Managua.

The earthquake leveled large parts of the city, including several hospitals, fire stations, and the homes of hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans.

The earthquake could not be blamed on the president, but the government response to the catastrophe was blamed on him. Despite substantial international aid, the reconstruction process was painfully slow, testing the patience of Managua's residents.

Countries such as Mexico, Costa Rica, Cuba, China, the Soviet Union, the United States, Spain, Japan, Venezuela, among others, joined in these humanitarian support efforts, sending rescuers and supplies21.

The sluggish pace of the process might have been influenced by the uncertainty among Nicaraguan leaders, including Somoza, regarding the wisdom of rebuilding the city in the same location.

In Somoza's opinion, it was necessary to look for another place that offered better guarantees, since the city was built between some thirteen volcanoes, which logically represented a constant danger.22

Ultimately, the downtown area of Managua was never fully reconstructed, and even today, a significant portion of the original downtown consists of parks, open spaces, and parking lots.

Whether due to corruption, incompetence or just lack of funding, the slow reconstruction and haphazard displacement of the downtown’s former residents generated further discontent with the regime.

Residents had long complained of the water stations interspersed throughout the neighbourhoods. When the government finally responded to their entreaties, it announced that the public water services would be removed and the residents would be charged to install taps in their homes. Riots broke out on the night of 7 October 1974. Residents destroyed the government-installed facilities.23

And Nicaraguan public opinion leaned towards the notion that their predicament was caused by corruption:

for example, Col. Rafael Adonis Largaespada, military aide-de-camp to General Somoza, paid $71,428 for a piece of land on June 4, 1975, and sold it to the Government for $3,342,000 on Sept. 24 of the same year. Such practices were exposed by an A.I.D. investigation, but the abuse of foreign assistance continued nonetheless.24

In addition to the earthquake’s aftereffects, ASol D’s government faced another challenge. The Somozas never enjoyed significant support from the Catholic Church, which was traditionally close to the right-wing conservative party, yet they also didn’t have to worry about the church actively denouncing their regimes.

This dynamic shifted with the ascent of ASol D. Under his rule, the Church, led by Managua Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo25, began to openly denounce the regime's political intolerance and escalating human rights violations.

This was particularly bad for Somoza due to the deeply religious nature of the Nicaraguan people and the close ties between the Nicaraguan clergy and many elite families.

In the aftermath of the earthquake, ASol D abandoned his latest half-hearted attempt to co-opt the political opposition. Although a triumvirate had ostensibly governed Nicaragua since May 197226, while Somoza remained as National Guard Chief, he circumvented the triumvirate and assumed the presidency of a newly established National Emergency Committee.

The next few years were marked by continued economic stagnation, increasing Sandinista activity - attacks on the National Guard, kidnappings, robberies, etc - and a devastated downtown Managua left to decay.

In October 1975, United States ambassador James Theberge described the situation in Nicaragua as follows27:

Sentiment in favor of the FSLN as the only active vehicle to challenge the regime seems to have grown in the past several weeks. This is generally attributed to the silencing of the overt opposition through censorship rendering it incapable of competing for the anti-government constituency. Overt opposition groups are experiencing grass roots pressures to cooperate with the FSLN as impatience among youth and unrest among campesinos makes itself felt… organized private sector sentiment has been muffled by timely GON28 concessions on energy rates and appointments to key government posts…the Church, has been silent and complacent encouraging the suspicion that Somoza has enticed it into an inoffensive posture through promises on Church reconstruction in Managua.

The final days

Until early 1978, ASol D had the support of the Nicaraguan business community, or at least he did not face significant opposition from it.

That situation changed in January 1978, following the assassination of Pedro Chamorro Cardenal, the owner and editor of Nicaragua's most widely circulated newspaper, La Prensa. Given that Chamorro Cardenal was a vocal critic of ASol D, his murder immediately raised suspicions of involvement by the Somoza regime.

Moreover, Chamorro Cardenal played a crucial role in the 1974 founding of the Unión Democrática de Liberación (UDEL), a political coalition that aimed to unify all peaceful opposition to Somoza - only to be eventually sidelined by the Sandinistas. His death marked a definitive break between the dictator and the Nicaraguan business community - shocked by the assassination of such a prominent business and political figure - whose leaders organized a 10-day business strike29, demonstrating their collective strength and capacity to exert pressure on Somoza.

After the assassination of Chamorro Cardenal, the days of the Somozas as supreme leaders of Nicaragua were counted. The Nicaraguan elite not only opposed ASol D politically, but also took up arms to challenge his rule.

The initial trickle of young Nicaraguans from elite families into the FSLN, a flow that had been going on for years, now became a torrent30. And the small, ineffective guerrilla grouping now became a growing and increasingly sophisticated movement.

By September 1978, the U.S. government was already preparing for the impending transition away from the Somoza regime:

Our preferred outcome is to see a moderate transitional government succeed General Somoza. While the Sandinistas, through the Group of 12, will no doubt participate in some form in this transitional government, our goal should be to try to isolate them and to minimize and to gradually reduce their influence. (If their influence is reduced gradually, that would permit the new government sufficient time to cohere, to gain the support of the Guardia, and to ultimately defeat the Sandinistas.)31

Eventually ASol D left Nicaragua in July 17, 1979, after writing a short resignation letter, leaving the country in the control of the Sandinistas. For weeks prior to his resignation, the FSLN - operating from its bases in Costa Rica and Honduras - had been steadily gaining ground, capturing city after city and closing in on Managua.

In July 19, 1979, the Sandinistas were welcomed into Managua as liberators by a population eager for change after years of devastation, economic stagnation, and, particularly in the final months of the Somoza regime, increasing physical violence.

I apologize for not providing more evidence in support of the argument I’m making (do read the footnotes please). This post is too brief to adequately explore all the material needed to substantiate my points effectively.

But I hope I have at least persuaded some of you of the following: the Sandinistas were not brought to power by a bottom-up rebellion of the Nicaraguan masses, driven by a longstanding aspiration for democracy.

The Nicaraguan revolution was led by young middle and upper-class Nicaraguans, who had no support from the popular classes until those impoverished Nicaraguans realized that Somoza was not capable of lifting them out of poverty. They did not support a leftist liberation movement against a supposed rightist dictatorship out of ideological conviction.

I plan to write a follow-up post that will enable me to explore this and other points in greater depth and breadth.

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